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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/ICS 83-3458 12 August 1983

LOGGED

88 AUG 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Executive Secretary, SIG(I)

SUBJECT:

Proposed NSDD--Reporting Hostile Contacts

REFERENCE:

Memo to Chmn, SIG(I) fm Chmn, IG/CI dtd 1 Jul 83, Subj: Proposed National Security Decision Directive

on Reporting Hostile Contacts

- 1. Action Requested: That you sign the transmittal letter (attached) to Judge Clark signifying your approval and endorsement of the proposed NSDD.
- 2. <u>Background</u>: I have circulated Judge Webster's memorandum to the DCI dated 1 July 1983 and the proposed NSDD to SIG(I) members for their personal review and comment. The SIG(I) members have concurred in the draft as written.

Attachment:

Proposed Ltr to Judge Clark

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SUBJECT: Proposed NSDD-Reporting Hostile Contacts

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Washington, D. C. 20505

DCI/ICS 83-3459

18 AUG 1983

The Honorable William P. Clark Assistant, to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

Bill:

The enclosed proposed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) calls for establishing programs throughout the Executive Branch whereby procedures be established to create and maintain awareness among Government employees of the potential threat to Government information from foreign sources, and to provide for reporting of contacts by employees with nationals of foreign countries or foreign political entities.

Implementation of the enclosed NSDD, which was prepared by the Interagency Group/Counterintelligence, should result in uniformity of regulations requiring the reporting of contacts with nationals of foreign nations. It will also increase emphasis on the security of Government information. Both activities would be of assistance to agencies responsible for counterintelligence efforts in the Government.

This proposed NSDD has the endorsement of the SIG(I) and is forwarded to you for future consideration by the National Security Council.

Sincerely,

/S/ John N. McMahan

John N. McMahon Acting Director

Enclosure



National	Security	
Decision	Directive	

As a corollary to existing measures presently in place to provide for physical, document and personnel security, the provisions of this directive will enhance the overall Government efforts to protect itself against illegal or unauthorized acquisition of information and technology vital to our national interest.

Many agencies, particularly those directly involved in the United States intelligence effort, foreign affairs and military matters, have well-developed programs designed to maintain a high level of security awareness and to examine relationships of their employees with foreign nationals. Agencies whose primary mission requires dealing in classified or otherwise sensitive information, while attractive targets for hostile foreign interests, are by no means the only agencies which are vulnerable to the loss of information or technology which may be critical to the ability of the United States to protect itself.

Responsibility for Security

Each Department or Agency must establish procedures which will:

- (1) Create and maintain a level of awareness among its employees of the potential threat to its information from foreign sources, whether overt or covert; and
- (2) provide for the reporting, under defined circumstances, of employee contacts with nationals of foreign countries or political entities as hereafter specified.

The nature and extent of this program will be commensurate with the potential for foreign interest in not only the classified information holdings of the entity, but also in its technological or other sensitive activities. The program should be tailored to meet the particular functions of the agency or department and the vulnerability of certain categories of employees who, through either their job functions or access to classified or sensitive information or technology, invite targeting or exploitation by foreign intelligence services. The program should be designed so as not to unreasonably intrude into privacy of employees or into their freedom of association.

Reporting of Hostile Contacts

Each Department or Agency must establish procedures which require its employees to report certain contacts.

- I. These procedures will require reporting of all contacts with individuals of any nationality, either within or outside the scope of the employee's official activities, in which:
 - (1) illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information, except for routine inquiries by accredited journalists.
 - (2) the employee is concerned that he or she may be the target of an attempted exploitation by a foreign entity.
- II. The procedures will also require reporting of any contacts with nationals of specific foreign countries or foreign political entities, which are determined by the department or agency as being of particular relevance to its security concerns and which involve:

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- (1) casual and recurring contacts that develop or are about to develop into close social relationships.
- (2) other contacts, the nature or frequency of which raise a counterintelligence concern as measured by internal criteria established by the employing department or agency.

Official or work-related social contacts, or casual and non-recurring contacts with nationals of these designated foreign countries or foreign political entities which do not fall in paragraph II (1) or (2) above, need not be reported.

The security officer or designated official of the agency or department will review and evaluate the reported information in accordance with the standards for reporting. The designation of particular countries as being of greater concern will provide a basis for the security officer or designated official to judge the relative importance of a particular contact. Any facts or circumstances of a reported contact which appear to indicate an attempt or intention to obtain unauthorized access to official information or technology, or which appear to offer a reasonable potential for such, shall be reported promptly by the responsible department or agency to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the case of employees in the United States and to the Central Intelligence Agency in the case of employees overseas. The CIA in turn will inform the FBI as appropriate.

Other Intelligence or Investigative Interests

Nothing in this directive is intended to modify the authority and responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence or the Central

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Intelligence Agency for counterintelligence abroad, nor does it in any way change existing procedures or agreements between CIA and the Department of State and other U.S. agencies regarding the reporting of hostile contacts outside the U.S. Neither does it preclude interagency agreements or directives affecting the relationship between the FBI and other intelligence or investigative agencies regarding their responsibility of personnel, physical or document security or territorial jurisdiction.

Review of Procedures

The head of each agency or department will provide a copy of the
procedures presently in existence or developed under this directive for
reporting hostile contacts to the Assistant to the President for Nationa
Security Affairs for review by

(12 Aug 83)

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